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In Section I various types of information structures in individual 
decision-making under uncertainty are discussed. A quantity which 
measures the value of information structure is proposed. In Section 
I I  the team decision problem is considered. Finally, in Section I I I  
we consider the multistage decision process with learning and we 
shall try to evaluate the effect of the learning structure and compute 
it by the technique of dynamic programming. 
I. INDIVIDUAL DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
When an individual is required to make a decision in which a utility 
function for a problem is given, it occasionally happens that the true 
state of nature is not known to him and he has only an opinion regarding 
the probabilities of the relevant states of nature. Suppose that the 
latter are indexed by a variable x, to which probability density functions 
on some measure re(x) may be attributed, and that the opinion of the 
decision-maker is given by a probabil ity density function f(x). Let ~I be 
the set of available decisions a and the utility of a, when the state of 
nature is x, be u(a, x). 
I t  is well-known that when the true state x is unknown to the decision- 
maker the Expected-Util ity Maxim would let him select that a maxi- 
mizing 
f u(a, x)f(x) din(x), 
if he is a rational decision-maker. 
Let us now introduce the concept of information structure. The 
information structure of the problem will be represented by a function 
I(x) defined on the set ~ of all possible states of nature. I t  is usually a 
nonstochastic many-to-one mapping defined over E and sometimes it is 
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a stochastic variable indexed by x. We shall exhibit several examples of 
conceivable information structures in the following. 
(i) COMPLETE INFORMATION (denoted by i(x)) 
i (x )  = x. The decision-maker is informed of the exact value of x. 
(ii) NuLL INFORMATION (denoted by [o(x)) 
Io(x) ~ ¢. The value of Io(x) is identically equal to the null set. No 
information is available to the decision-maker. 
(iii) PARTITION INFOm~ATION (denoted by I~,(x)) 
Let 
N 
i= l  
be a given finite or infinite decomposition of 5, i.e., N = oo is allowed. 
Let 
Ie(x) = i, if x E R~ (i = 1, - . . ,  N).  
In this case the decision-maker is only informed which of the sets R~ the 
true state x of nature belongs to. 
(iv) RANDOM INFOmIAT ION 
Somet imes  the decision-maker can observe the true state x of nature 
only through the interference of some random disturbance. Suppose 
that the nature of the random disturbance is known and that it is 
represented by  a probability density function r(.) on ~. Let I(x) = 
x + z where  z is a random variable on ~ with the probability density 
function r(z). 
Intuitively speaking, the information structure I(x) represents the 
information on which  decision a is based. Let A(I(x)) denote any  
function of I(x) which  maps  onto g[, representing a decision rule for a. 
Let f (x)  din(x) = dF(x). We shall next show that the value of the infor- 
mation structure I(x) can be defined by the amount 
- -  dE(x)- max (1.1) 
The above difference measures the advantage or profit obtained by a 
rational decision-maker under the information structure I (x) compared 
to the case of complete ignorance. 
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THEOREM 1. (i) We have 
v(ZEF) = f marX u(a,x) dF(x) -- max f u(a,x)dF(x), (1.2) 
v(Ie]F) = max ~ fR u(A ( i ) ,x)dF(x)-  mex f u(a,x)dF(x). (1.3) 
A(1) , . . . ,A(N)  = 
(ii) 0 = v(Io[F) <= v( I IF )  < v(i l  F). 
PnooF: (i) Since I(x) = x and 
max f u(A(x), x)dE(x) = f max u(a, X) dF(x) A (. ) .I ,J a 
we have the stated equality (1.2). (1.3) is also easily verified from 
(1.1) and the definition of Ie (x). 
(ii) Since [o(X) is independent of x, it follows by (1.1) that V(Io ] F) = 
0. The restriction of the class of admissible decision functions to the 
smaller class {A(. ) = a identically I a C ~[} yields the proof of v(I ] F) > 
0. The last inequality v(I ] F) <= v(i I F) is verified from the easily 
proved relation 
max f ,) dF(,) f max u(a, X)  dF(x). 
A(*) J J a 
We shall list several examples of values of information structures in 
Table I. The proofs of the results in the table are obtained by straight- 
forward use of (1.2) and (1.3) in each of six cases and hence will be 
omitted. 
We have already mentioned four types of information structures in 
(i)-(iv). Let us now consider two further examples. 
(v) PARTIAL INFORMATION 
We assume that the state variable is two-dimensional nd the proba- 
bility element of its distribution is given by dF(xl, x~). Let the infor- 
mation structure be 
I ( x l  , x~) = x~ , 
that is, the decision-maker in this case is forced to make the decision 
only in the light of knowledge of x~. Under this information structure 
we have by (1.1) 
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I"  1. 
v(I I F(xl , x2)) = max J dF(xl) J u(A(x~);x~,x~)dF(x21x~) a(,) 
-- max  f u(a; xl, x2) dF(xl, ,~) 
a d 
where we have set dF(xl , x=) = dF(xl) dF(x2 [ xl). 
For a simple i l lustration assume that  ?I = ( - % o~), ~ = ( - m, 00) 5 
and u(a; xl , x2) = - (a - (xl --k x2)/2) 2. Then we obtain the value 
and the optimal decision rule 
A *(x,) = f x, ÷ x, dF(x, Ix1) 
2 
where V(. ) and V(. ] x0 are respectively the variance and the conditional 
variance of the random variable. For  comparison it should be remarked 
here that  in the complete- information case of I (Xl ,  x~) = (xl,  x2) we 
have v ( I [  F) = V( (X1 -F X2)/2) .  
(vi) A STATISTICAL DECISION PROBLEM 
We shall consider the statistical decision problem of discriminating 
among a homogeneous et of /c distributions F1, . . . ,  F~ from our 
information viewpoint. Let ~I = ~E = {1, . . .  , /~} and u(a, x) = 1, 
if a = x; = 0, if a # x. The information structure of our decision problem 
is another type of random information as mentioned in ( iv).  Let  I (x )  
be the random variable indexed by x with the probabi l i ty element 
Pr{z < I (x )  <- z -4- dz} = dF~(z) (x = 1 , . . . ,  1~). 
Assume that  X = (hi ,  • • • , Xk) is given representing the a priori proba- 
bilities of t ruth of each hypothesis that  F~ is the " t rue"  distribution. 
Then by  (1.1) the value of the information structure becomes 
v(I IX) = max ~_. X~ I u(A(z), x) dF.(z) -- max ~ X~u(a, X). 
A( . )  x=l  d--~a l<_a<_k x~l  
Let  the class of admissible decision rules be the set 
A(z)  = a, if z C Sa (a = 1, . . .  , £), 
where {&,  . . .  , Se} is a decomposit ion of the common sample space of 
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F~'s. Thus it follows that, using the definition of the utility function, 
we have 
v(IIX) = max ~Xi  dF/z)- -  max hi, 
{s l , . . . , sk}  y~t  j z <__y <l~ 
and the optimal decision rule is characterized by the decomposition f 
the sample space that maximizes ~=1 XjsflF/z). This decision rule, 
as is well-known in mathematical statistics (for example, Weiss, 1961), 
is the Bayes decision rule with respect o X for discriminating among 
F1, "'" , Fl0. 
II. TEAM DECISION-MAKING UNDER UNCERTAINTY 
In a team decision problem (Marschak, 1954; Radner, 1959) there 
are two or more decision variables, and these decisions can be made to 
depend upon different aspects of the environment or information vari- 
ables, the resulting payoff being a random variable. The choice of optimal 
rules for making decisions under the given information structures i the 
central theme of the problem. 
The following discussion is in terms of two decision variables and two 
random parameters, in order to clarify its relation to the examples of 
the previous ection, but the generalization to any number of decision 
variables and random parameters is obvious. 
Consider a team with two decision-makers, which will be denoted by 
I and II. Let a, b, . . .  be decision variables; x, y . . .  be random-state 
variables; u(a, b; x, y) ... the utility function which is common to I 
and II; and further suppose that I can make decisions about a only and 
II can make decisions about b only, both according to decision rules 
agreed upon in advance, and that any exchange of information between 
the two is forbidden. Let I(x, y) be the information obtained by I on 
which action a is based; J(x, y), the information obtained by II on 
which action b is based; A(I(x, y)), the decision rule used by I which 
depends upon [(x, y); and B(J(x, y)), the decision rule used by II 
which depends upon J(x, y). Let F(x, y) be the cumulative distribution 
function over the product space ~ X ~ where ~ is the set of all possible 
parameter values of y. 
The difference 
v(I, J lF) = max 
A( . ) ,B ( . )  X~ 
u(A(I(x, y)), B(J(x, y)); x, y) dF 
- -  maxf~ u(a, b; x, y) dF 
a,b XO 
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will then be called the value of the information structure (I, J )  of the 
team. The following inequalities can now be established. Proofs can be 
made in the same way as in Theorem 1 and will be omitted• 
THEOREM 2. (i) We have 
v(i, ] IF) = f max u(a, b; x, y) dF - max f dF. 
a,b a,b 
(ii) We have for every I and J
fv(Io, J IF)} 
0 = v(Io, JoIF) <-_ \v( I ,  JoIF) v(I, J lF) 
~v(i, JtF) } 
<= F(L 2 F) < v(i, 2[F). 
III. LEARNING STRUCTURE IN ADAPTIVE CONTROL 
PROCESSES 
In the last few years, the mathematical theory of control processes 
has attracted a great deal of attention. The processes of interest are 
"learning" or "adaptive" processes in which it is required to act and 
learn simultaneously. The foundation for a general theory of these 
processes in a mathematical framework was first laid by Bellman and 
Kalaba (1959), and Bellman (1961). The purpose of this section is to 
describe in more detail the learning structure in adaptive control proc- 
esses. 
We formulate the problem as a mathematical system of two random 
variables R, S and a real-valued function ~, 
[S(a, x; r], S(a, x; r), ¢(x)] 
where r represents the random parameter and we interpret R(a, x; r) 
as the "immediate return" to the action when decision a is employed in 
state x; S(a, x; r) as the "successor state" following x at the beginning 
of the succeeding time period if decision a is employed; and ¢(x) as 
the "value" of the final state x of the process• Of course if we know the 
distribution function G(r) of the random parameter, and if we consider 
an N-stage decision process, then we are led to the problem of 
(3.1) 
~F 
• I IdG( r , ) -~  ma~ , 
t= l  {A t(')}N=l 
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where {At(.)}t=1 is the "policy." i.e., a sequence of decision function 
At(xt) 's,  and xt+l = S(At (x t ) ,  x, ; ~/t) (t = 1, . . .  , N) .  
When we are forced to act without a complete knowledge of G(r) 
then the problem of adaptive centre1 arises. Let us define an information 
pattern as a sequence of information structures, i.e., 
P {L(n ,  , . . . .  r~_~)}~=2 
and define a learning structure as a sequence 
L = {01(r), ~2(r [/2), "'", ~( r  j/N)}, 
where each estimate of G(r) is based on the information, I t ,  available 
on the time period t. ~l(r)  is an a priori estimate of G(r) without use of 
any information about G(r). 
A natural consideration leads to the following behavior for a rational 
decision-maker, under the given information pattern P ; he first chooses 
a reasonable arning structure L and then solves the maximizing problem 
. (3.2) 
• ]-IdO,(r~iL)~ max 
t=l {~(.)}N=l 
where {At(.)}~=, is the "policy," i.e., a sequence of decision function 
At(xt ,  It)'s each based on x~ and on the information I t ,  and xt+l = 
S(At (x t  , It) ,  x~ ; rt) (t = 1, . . .  , N ; / ,  =- null set). 
Let the optimal policy of the problem (3.2) be denoted by {At*(. ) }~=1 
and let that of the problem (3.1) with G replaced by ~1 be written as 
{At°( • )}~=~. Then we are led to the following two types of definitions 
of the efieacy of the learning structure L under the given information 
pattern P and the given "true" distribution function G(r) of the random 
parameter, 
e l (L iP )  -- 
f . . . / [5  ST(A,*(z,*, s,), x~*; r , ) , ~  + +(x~+~)] l~ d0,(r, I / , ) ,=~ (3.3) 
- f S[:=D R(A,o(,,o), x,O; r,) + +(2+,)] d0,(r,), 
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(3.~) 
{5 }I" p/A  O[X o~ X o - 1.~ t,, , ,, t ; rt) + ¢(x°+,) I I  dG(rt), t= l  t= l  
* 0 where xt and xt are defined by 
* * * -- S(At (xt , It), * x, ; r,) Xt+l  
(3.5) 
o S 'A°"  o, x O;rt) Xt+l  : ( t (X t  ) ,  
* 0 . fort  = 1, . . . ,N ;x l  = xl = Xx,I1 ~ null set. 
It  should be remarked that sometimes we may have e~(L ] P)  < 0 or 
e2( L ] P, G) < O. 
Let us now consider the method of computing the efficacies explicitly. 
The optimal policies IAt*(. )}~V=l and {At°( • )}~v=l are obtained by the 
technique of dynamic programming as follows. 
For the problem (3.2), for instance, defining 
hk,N(X~,Ik)=-- max f ... f 
("( ') ILk (3.6) 
• [~R(At(xt,It),x~;rt)~=k + ~(xN+~)] flt=,~ dOt(rt,et) 
for k = 1, . . .  , N, the principle of optimality (Bellman, 1961) yields 
h~,N(x, I~) 
f [R(a, x; r) + hk+l,V(S(a, x; r), Ik+l)] dOk(r ]Ik) (3.7) max 
a 
(k = 1, . . -  ,N;  hN+l,N(x, I) =-- ¢(x)) .  
The problem is solved by computing hN,v(x, I) first, and then h,~,v(x, I) 's 
downwards recursively. The sequence of the maximizing a's at each 
stage determines the optimal policy {Ak (xk, Ik)}~=~. The optimal 
policy {At°( • )}~v=~ will be derived similarly. 
Let h~,.~(xk , Ik I G) be the maximand in the right-hand side of (3.6) 
with At,  xt, and Ot(rt l i t )  replaced by At*, xt , and G(rt), respec- 
tively. Then we easily have the recurrence relation 
hk,~(x~ , I~ ]G) 
f , * * * * 
[R(Ak (x~ , Ik), r) + h~+~,~(xk+~ I~+1 ]G)] dG(r) (3.8) = X!~ ; , 
(l~ = 1, . . .  ,N;h~v+~.N(x , I IG)  =-- ¢(x*)), 
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where {xt*} is defined by (3.5), from which we can compute h* 1,h r
(xl, I~ [ G). Let h°~(x~ ° I G) be defined for the policy {A f(-)} similarly 
as in h* ~,~¢ ; we have a similar recurrence relation as (3.8) and can corn- 
0 pure hl,s(xl [ G), where {xt °} is defined by (3.5). The efficacies (3.3) and 
, -- hl,.~(Xl [ 01) and (3.4) are equal to the differences hl,~(xl I i)  o 
h~,zc(xl, I~ [G) - h°,N(x~ [G) respectively. 
In support of the discussions above, we present a simple example, 
which has been treated by Bellman and Kalab~ (1958). Consider a 
coin with the probability P of heads. A gambler, without knowing this 
probability is required to place a bet on the event of head. He is allowed 
to bet a quantity a, subject o the restriction 0 <= a <= x, where x is his 
capital at the present stage. If he bets correctly he then wins, otherwise 
he loses. Continuing this betting process for N stages, and assuming 
that tossings of the coin are independent at these stages and that the 
gambler wishes to maximize the expected value of the logarithm of the 
final total at the end of the process, the problem then is to determine an 
optimal betting policy. 
Let r be a binomial r.v. with parameter p(0 < p < 1), and let 
r= l  
R(a, x; r) -- 0; S(a, x; r) = ; ~(x) = log x. 
-a ,  r=0 
The action space when given xk, Ik is the interval 0 =< a < xk. Let 
t--1 
I~( r l ,  . . .  , r , _ l )  = ~ r~, 
i=J_ 
0Z1) -0~(1-o ) -  '~ -1 - (O~(o) -Ox(o -o ) ) ,  
t - -1  
1 
O~(1]L )  - 0~(1 - o1I~) = ~ +,8  + t -  1 
= 1 - (0 , (o l  I , )  - ~ , (o  - e l i , ) ) ,  
where a and /3 are given positive numbers. Corresponding to the re- 
currence re]ations (3.7) we have 
hdx;  s, u) = max [q~,~hz-l(x -t- a; s + 1, u) 
O~_a<_x 
-t- (1 -- q~.~)hz_l(x -- a; s, u -[- 1)] (3.9) 
( s+u+l= N; l=  1, . - . ,N ;h0(x ;s ,u )  = logx) ,  
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if we write hk,~(x, Ik) with ~-'~-~ rl = s in (3.7) as h~c-k+1(x; s, k -- 1 -- s) 
and set q~,~ = (a -t- s)/(ce q- ~ q- ~ q- u).  Solving the equations above 
we obtain 
hz(x; s, u) = log x q- c~(s, u) (1 = 1, . . .  , N )  
where c~(s, u) is determined by 
ct(s, u) = q~.~c~_l(s -t- 1, u) -k (1 -- q~,u)cl-l(s, u q- 1) 
q- {log 2 -- H(max(q~,~, 1))} (3.10) 
(l = 1, . . .  , N;  Co(S, u) =-- 0), 
in which we have set 
H(q)  ~ --q log q -- (1 -- q)log(1 -- q). 
The optimal policy in (3.9) is determined by the optimal choice 
Az*(x ;s ,u )  = maxI(2q~,u- 1)x, 01 ( l=  1 , . - . ,N )  
at each stage independently of 1. Proceeding in the same way we find 
0 hz (x I ~)  = log x q- /{log 2 -- H(max(q00,1))} 
(l = 1 , - . .  ,N).  
A~°(x) = max{(2q0o- 1)x, 0} 
Thus it follows that 
e l (L IP )  = h~(xl ;0, 0) - hN°(x~ [ 01) 
(3.11) 
= cN(0, 0) -- N{log 2 -- H(max(a/ (c~ -k fl), ½))}, 
where c~(0, 0) is derived from (3.10). 
In quite a similar manner we get, corresponding to (3.8), 
hz*(x; s, u I G) = log x q- cz*(s, u) 
where c~*(s, u) is determined by 
c~ (s, u) pc*_l(s + 1, u) + (1 * s = - p )c~_~( ,  u + 1) 
q- {log2 -- H (max(q . . . .  ½))} (3.12) 
( l  = 1, . . .  , N ;  Co*(s, u )  = 0) .  
in which we have set 
H*(q)  -- -- p logq- -  (1 -- p) log (1 -- q) 
q -~p log  - (  q q- (1 -- p) log~- -~} l  - p (>0) .  H(p)  
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Moreover,  since we can obtain 
o hz(x IG)  = logx  q- /{ log2-  H*(m~x(q00,½))} (l = 1, . . .  ,N )  
it follows that  
e2(LIP, a)  = h~*(x l  ; 0, 0 [G)  - hd(xl I G) 
= c~*(o,  o) (3.13)  
--N{log 2 -- H*(max(a/ (a  q- fl), ½))}, 
where cN*(0, 0) is derived from (3.12). 
F rom (3.10) ~nd (3.11) it follows that  ef fL ]P )  > 0 if qoo = 
a/ (a  + fl) < ½, an intuit ively obvious result. But  we have el(L [ P) ~ 0 
if q00 > ½. Furthermore,  f rom (3.12) and (3.13) we have e2(L ] P, G) ~ O. 
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